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Abstract
Financial diﬃculties of U.S. cities have recently become a major issue of concern.
However, there is little agreement on why certain cities experience crises while others
do not. Two arguments are put forward: Cities suﬀer from (1) structural problems like
high immigration, congestion etc. (2) non-structural political problems like the weak-
ness of the mayor, union-power etc. We present a common pool resource framework of
municipal goods and derive estimation equations. It is shown that spending and debt
levels increase in the degree of the common pool problem. The common pool problem
is operationalized by socio-demographic variables, which capture structural problems.
The estimation is based on 900 U.S. cities in 1985, 1991 and 1999. Structural factors
explain most of the variation of spending and debt levels. Furthermore, coeﬃcients
are stable over time. However, excessively high debt burdens, which are taken as
indicators of potential crisis, and high spending levels are regression outliers and not
explained by structural factors. We conclude that ﬁscal crises are not predicted by
socio-demographic, structural factors.
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1 Introduction
Recently, ﬁscal distress and crises have become issues of considerable concern for U.S.
States and cities. Mayors ask for State aid to compensate for revenue short falls (The
Economist May 22nd, 2003) and (Herbert January 16, 2003). Some argue that New York
City now faces the worst ﬁscal crisis since the mid-1970 (Cooper May 7, 2003). In Oregon,
school districts are thinking of shortening the school year to avoid large deﬁcits. Even
States are aﬀected by the ﬁscal distress and lay oﬀ employees. While media coverage of
ﬁscal distress and crises is substantial, systematic evidence on determinants of crises and,
at an earlier stage, distress is quite scarce.
Views on what constitutes a ﬁscal crisis are diverging in the literature.2 Inman (1995)
deﬁnes a ﬁscal crisis as a situation when a city’s potential to raise revenues is insuﬃcient
to cover the city’s legally required expenditures. Case studies have shown that a ﬁscal
crisis is usually characterized by the refusal of lenders to give any additional credit. In
the case of Philadelphia, for example, the lenders of the city government refused further
credit, since part of the credit was to be used to repay accumulated debt. Lenders evaluate
the credit worthiness of a city among others on the basis of the debt burden. If the debt
burden is too high, further credit is refused (Capeci 1991, 1994), (Bayoumi, Goldstein, and
Woglom 1995). This happened in for example New York city. Debt levels are therefore a
good indicator of ﬁscal distress of a city as also argued by Fuchs (1992, p. 30) and Clark
(1994). Ultimately long lasting ﬁscal distress can lead to a ﬁscal crisis. Thus, ﬁscal crisis
can be operationalized by identifying cities with high debt burdens.
Following the period of ﬁscal crises in the mid-1970s, numerous papers investigated the
determinants of ﬁscal crises in speciﬁc cases. Gramlich (1976) and Shefter (1992) study
the crisis of New York in 1975, Inman (1995) studies the case of Philadelphia in 1990.
These case studies usually emphasize a combination of factors to be responsible for the
crisis. On the one hand, changes in socio-economic conditions are mentioned. On the other
hand, speciﬁc political actors (e.g. a mayor) are seen to be at the root of the problem.
In a series of articles, Bradbury (1982, 1983a, and 1983b) investigates ﬁscal distress and
its causes in a number of major American cities. She ﬁnds that besides structural factors,
city management and unmeasured costs determine ﬁscal diﬃculties of a city. Fuchs (1992)
compares ﬁscal policies of New York City and Chicago and argues that Chicago avoided
ﬁscal instability in 1975 because of the role of politics, especially the role of local party
organization. The mayor of New York had little support in his party and therefore had to
buy support by satisfying the demands of various interest groups. Similarly Poterba (1994)
shows that political and institutional factors matter for adjustments to ﬁscal shocks. A
State with a governor of one party and a congress with opposing political party majority
2Honadle (2003) in a survey of State auditors ﬁnds that only 10 States have a formal deﬁnition of crises,
21 States made clear that their states do not deﬁne ﬁscal crises in any way. 36 States reported that they
had a crises recently. McConnel and Picker (1993) discuss municipal bankruptcy from a legal point of
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is slower to react to shocks. The First National Bank of Boston (1981) points out that,
while socio-economic indicators cause ﬁscal conditions, they are not the main cause for
ﬁscal distress. Fiscal distress is not inevitable but within the ”grasp of management
control of most cities”. Also Honadle (2003) summarizes the answers of State government
oﬃcials on causes of ﬁscal crises. Oﬃcials mention structural (economic, demographic and
institutional) factors, and non-structural factors (management and politics) as reasons.
However, the relative importance of these factors is not assessed. There is thus little
systematic evidence on the main determinants of ﬁscal crises in a large sample of U.S.
cities.
The present paper investigates the determinants of ﬁscal crisis in 900 U.S. cities in the
mid 1980s, early 1990s and late 1990s. Since no systematic data-set on the occurrence of
ﬁscal crises in U.S. cities exists, we identify cities in ﬁscal crises with a cluster analysis.
The cluster of cities with a high debt-per-capita level is in state of distress, while low
levels are a sign of ﬁscal health. We argue that ﬁscal distress is a situation from which
ﬁscal crisis is likely to result. Potential determinants of ﬁscal distress are derived from a
common pool resource framework (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In this framework, the
budget of a city is considered to be a pool from which the inhabitants of a city want to
get as many services as possible. Since many services beneﬁt only limited groups, while
the burden of ﬁnancing is spread on all tax payers through the common budget, voters
will demand more than they would if they incorporated the full cost of the service. In
an intertemporal setting, it is shown that the common pool problem will in addition to
higher spending levels lead to higher debt levels.3 The degree of the common pool resource
problem is operationalized by structural factors such as socio-demographic characteristics.
As these characteristics vary across cities, expenditure and debt of city governments will
be diﬀerent. We empirically test the model and show that 90 percent of the cross-city
variation in spending and debt is explained by the model. In a second step, we assess
the importance of the factors identiﬁed by the model to explain ﬁscal crises. An analysis
of the identiﬁed distressed cities shows that their high spending and debt levels are not
explained by this empirical common pool model based on measurable socio-demographic
factors. Fiscal crisis thus results from non-structural factors such as mismanagement,
union-power in public administrations and weak mayors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
common pool model and develops the empirical strategy. We then discuss the available
data. Section 4 presents the estimation results for the determinants of public spending
and debt. Section 5 discusses the cluster of ﬁscally distressed cities and compares them
with the non-distressed cities. The last section concludes.
3A large political economy literature investigates debt accumulation on a country level, for surveys see
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Woo (2003). On the other hand, Barro (1979) explains accumulation of
public debt in a neoclassical model by a now standard tax-smoothing argument. Sustained accumulation
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2 Framework: the common pool resource problem
Consider a city with a variety of diﬀerent population groups, which diﬀer in their prefer-
ences for local public goods. The members of each group mainly beneﬁt from the speciﬁc
good provided for them. The good is ﬁnanced by the general budget of the city which
is a common pool. An example are swimming pools which are typically ﬁnanced out of
the common budget, while their beneﬁts accrue exclusively to those who go swimming.
Similarly, social services for the poor beneﬁt a restricted group of people, while the related
costs are paid out of the common budget. The common pool resource literature shows
that these constellations will lead to an ineﬃcient over-provision of the public good if
individual groups manage to inﬂuence the government in their interest. The intuition for
this result is the following: The cost of each municipal good is spread to all tax-payers,
while the beneﬁt accrues to the individual. Thus the individual will demand more than a
benevolent planner of the municipal good, since the beneﬁt from the good in the view of
the beneﬁciary is larger than it is for the general public.
2.1 Demand for municipal goods in a common pool setting
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and similarly Borcherding and Deacon (1972) present
a model of demand for municipal goods, which we take as a starting point. From the
municipal good g an individual consumer i receives the fraction
g∗
i = n−γg, (1)
where n is the population size and g is the total amount of the municipal good provided.
Thus g∗
i characterizes the actual quantity received by an individual consumer. If γ = 0, the
municipal facility is a pure Samuelson (1954)-type public good, which fulﬁlls the condition
of non-rivalry. If 0 < γ ≤ 1, there is a limited degree of rivalry in the use of the good, γ > 1
indicates considerable crowding out in the use of the good. In the latter case a city with a
larger population needs to provide over-proportional quantities of the municipal good in
order for the individual consumer to enjoy the same level of municipal good consumption
as she would in a small city.
The utility of an individual i is given by
Vi = lnci,1 + lnci,2 + lng∗
i,1 + lng∗
i,2 (2)
where ci,t denotes private consumption of individual i in period t. It is assumed that
ﬁrst period municipal consumption is ﬁnanced by issuing debt b =
P
bi. Furthermore the
public sector cannot default.4 The city raises a tax rate τ on second period income in
4The last assumption is not as strict as it might appear as pointed out by Inman (2001). In fact,
the number of American cities going bankrupt in recent years was very limited. In the last years, the
main defaults were incurred by NYC, Camden, Philadelphia, Bridgeport, Miami and Orange County and
Washington D.C. (p.60). Of these cities, only Camden and Washington D.C. received bail-outs for speciﬁc
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order to repay the debt and to cover second period public consumption. Every individual
pays a fraction 0 < ζi < 1 of the public good, which has a relative price q. Given that r
is the interest rate, the budget constraint of individual i can be speciﬁed as follows:
ci,1 = yi,1 − bi (3)
ci,2 = (1 − τ)yi,2 + (1 + r)bi (4)
where yi,t denotes the income of person i in period t. Thus, ﬁrst period income of an indi-
vidual is used to consume and to buy city debt, in the second period, private consumption
equals the sum of after tax income and the repaid debt.
The tax income received from the individual i is thus equivalent to the share of the
municipal good in period 1 and period 2 paid by individual i:
τyi,2 = q1ζg1 + q2ζg2 (5)
and
bi = q1ζg1 (6)
The consolidated budget constraint is, assuming for simplicity an interest rate of zero
(r = 0) and no discounting, then given by:
ci,1 + ci,2 = yi,1 + (1 − τ)yi,2 = yi,1 + yi,2 − q1ζg∗
i,1nγ − q2ζg∗
i,2nγ (7)
Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp.345) have shown that spending and debt levels are
larger than socially optimal in such a setting if a common pool problem exists.5 They start
by calculating the optimal allocation of a benevolent planner and compare this allocation
with the allocation under decentralized decision taking. It is shown that ﬁrst and second
period consumption of municipal goods is larger than in the case of the benevolent planner.
This eﬀect arises since the individuals living in a city take as their budget constraint for
municipal goods the entire budget of the city. Thus, as the cost of a good is spread on
all taxpayers and the beneﬁt accrues to only a limited group, the demand will be higher
than optimal.6 In a two period setting it can further be shown that there exists an inter-
temporal common pool problem, which will give rise to accumulation of debt higher than
in the case of a benevolent planner (Velasco 2000).
2.2 Estimation strategy
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint (Equation 7), it follows
immediately, that c1 = c2 and g∗
1 = g∗
2 if q1 = q2. Let δ be the constant price elasticity
5A model with inﬁnite periods is presented in Velasco (2000), the main insights, however, remain the
same.
6An important issue concerns the question whether the demand of individual groups will actually be
fulﬁlled by the government. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), von Hagen and Harden (1995) and von
Hagen (1992) investigate the importance of the common pool problem in the context of budget processes
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and  the constant income elasticity and abstract from the common pool problem, using
the ﬁrst order conditions from the above maximization problem yields
g1 = nγg∗
1 = k(y1 + y2)(q1ζnγ)δ
where k is a constant. It simpliﬁes to
g1 = nγ(1+δ)(y1 + y2)(q1ζ)δ · k. (8)
Taking logs, the following equation can be estimated:
ln(g) = c + αln(n) + ln(y) + δ ln(q1ζ) + βX ... (9)
where
α = γ(1 + δ). (10)
from which the degree of crowding out γ can be calculated.7 Demand for municipal goods
thus depends on the population size, income, the price of the municipal good in terms of
taxes and X, which is a vector of variables capturing the importance of the common pool
problem. In the estimation, we need to operationalize these factors and we include social
and demographic variables inﬂuencing the degree of the common pool problem (see Ladd
and Yinger (1989) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973)).
The common pool resource model predicts that those factors increasing spending, will
also lead to higher debt. Thus we performed the same regressions taking the debt level as
the dependent variable.
ln(debt) = c + αln(n) + ln(y) + δ ln(q1ζ) + βX ... (11)
However, we do not assume that income and the tax rate should determine the debt level,
since they do not constitute factors of the common pool problem.
3 Data
The data set is taken from the County and City data book (CCDB) (U.S. Census Bureau
1988, 1994, 2000) and includes data for 971 (CCDB 1988) incorporated cities, boroughs,
town, and villages (short: cities) in the United States that had 25,000 or more inhabitants
in April 1980, 1070 (CCDB 1994, 2000) cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants as of
April 1, 1990. The data set consists of a compilation of diﬀerent data. It includes data
on the city budget (tax income, grants, expenditure, debt), the economic conditions of
the inhabitants (income, employment, unemployment, poverty, employment in diﬀerent
7Oates (1988) argues that the estimated coeﬃcient of 1 (the quasi-private nature of public goods) can
be the result of the so-called ”zoo-eﬀect”. Larger communities oﬀer a greater variety of goods and services.
Therefore, there is no congestion but rather a greater range of services. However, most expenditure
categories, like social services, policing, ﬁre, sewerage, and highways do not appear to be subject to Oates’
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industries), and socio-demographic data (population, age, education, housing, races and
ethnic composition, birth rates, crime rates). The debt levels were taken from the County
and City Extra book (Bernan Press, DeBrandt, and Gaquin 1994, 2002) if not available
in the other source.
4 Regression analysis
4.1 Municipal expenditure
Table 1 presents estimation results of equation 9. More than 90 percent of the variance
can be explained by structural variables.8 Municipal spending is largely determined by
price, income, population size and additional demographic and control variables reﬂecting
the common pool problem. The income elasticity of demand is 0.9, the price elasticity is
negative, however not always signiﬁcant.9 Population size is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1
in those regression, that do not include the tax base. Larger cities need to spend over-
proportionally more to achieve the same level of perceived consumption. There are thus
dis-economies of scale to the production or consumption of local municipal goods. Com-
puting the coeﬃcient γ of crowding out according to Equation (10) conﬁrms the result.
It is larger than 1 in all speciﬁcations. The advantages of sharing costs are overcompen-
sated by increased costs of either production or the sharing of these goods. There are
no economies of scale to larger municipalities. Spending reacts to employment. Cities
with 1 percentage point more employment per capita spend around 0.85 percent more.
Poverty and birth rates are also factors increasing spending as predicted by the common
pool model.
The coeﬃcients of the variables are stable over time. We tested formally for equivalence
of coeﬃcient and had to reject the H0 that the diﬀerence of coeﬃcients for columns 3-5 is
zero. The Chow (1960) test on all variables except intergovernmental grants, however, did
not allow to reject the hypothesis of constant coeﬃcients in time. We therefore present
results of pooled regressions allowing for ﬂexibility of the coeﬃcient intergovernmental
grant in time (last column).
House ownership signiﬁcantly reduces spending of cities. Cities taking care of schools
(education) on average spend 28 percent more than those that do not. Health spending is
a strong factor of city spending. Cities engaged in the provision of health services, spend
50 percent more than cities which do not. Increasing intergovernmental grants to cities
clearly increases spending. Each additional 100 dollars per capita will increase spending
by 0.07 percent, the eﬀect of intergovernmental transfers on spending is thus negligibly
8We also performed robust (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) estimation to account for heteroscedas-
ticity problems. The results did not change. We also controlled for those cities performing county functions,
the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant and therefore not reported.
9We approximated the tax price q1ζ with the base of the most important tax, the property tax. The
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low, they are apparently used to reduce tax burdens. City with a larger percentage of His-
panics have lower spending levels. This might reﬂect thee diﬀerence in voting participation
of Hispanics, which is about half as high as voting participation of Whites and African
Americans (U.S. Census Bureau 1989). The percentage of seniors increases the demand for
municipal spending. Crime rates signiﬁcantly increase spending of municipalities. Central
cities spend more, since they probably have to provide a lot of infrastructure for neigh-
boring communities. The system of municipal organization in form of a council-manager
(CM) system or a mayor-council (MC) had no inﬂuence on spending. We therefore do not
report the regression results. However, the system of MC is more common in larger cities,
which also have higher spending per capita.
The cross sectional variation in spending levels is explained to more than 90 percent by
structural, economic and socio-demographic factors. This can be taken as an indication
of the low importance of political factors like the degree of organization of municipal
employees, the ”ﬁscal liberalism” of the mayor or the party membership of the mayor,
factors not included in the regression. In fact, Miranda and Walzer (1994) ﬁnd that these
variables are insigniﬁcant in regressions explaining the level spending and also the change
in this spending for a limited set of cities.
4.2 Municipal debt
Only few articles empirically investigate the determinants of municipal debt (Sharp 1986),
(Farnham 1988). The ﬁndings indicate that debt levels are largely inﬂuenced by longer-
term factors, such as population, functional scope and regional location.
The results of the estimation of Equation 11 are presented in Table 2. 63 percent of the
cross city variation in debt is explained by our model in all three years. The driving factor
behind debt is the population size. Larger cities have signiﬁcantly higher debt. In addition,
the coeﬃcient for the log of population is signiﬁcantly larger than 1 as it was for spending.
Cities, that have experienced higher population growth in the years before the cross section
also have accumulated more debt. Income per capita does not explain the observed debt
levels. The median house value was also insigniﬁcant (not reported). The coeﬃcient
on population density is signiﬁcantly negative, thus more densely populated cities have
lower debt levels. The percentage of people living in their own house signiﬁcantly reduces
accumulation of public debt. Again it can be argued that house-owners know about the
future cost of debt. Increased intergovernmental grants increase the debt level. However,
they are probably an endogenous variable and therefore we performed the regressions
without them and found no considerable changes for the other variables. The higher the
percentage of seniors in a city, the lower will be the debt level of a city. This probably
reﬂects the fact that seniors are less likely to leave a city and thereby escape the debt
burden of the city, as young people might intend to do. Seniors appear to internalize the
future cost of debt. Higher crime rates are associated with higher debt levels. Poverty
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variable income, possibly reﬂecting the common pool problem. Alternatively, we ﬁnd some
evidence for the theory by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), who relate the choice of the
debt level to inter- and intra-generational redistribution. Central cities all have clearly
higher debt burdens in 1985 and 1999, the coeﬃcient is however not signiﬁcant in 1991.
Cities with a larger public labor force per capita also have chosen signiﬁcantly higher debt
levels. A city with 1 additional city employee per 100 inhabitants will have a 37 percent
higher debt burden in 1985, which dropped to 27 percent in 1991. The level of formal
education of the population has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the debt level (not reported).
The estimated coeﬃcients are very stable in time. We had to reject the H0 of equal
coeﬃcients with the Chow test. However, if we test for equality of coeﬃcients omitting
the coeﬃcient of ”central” the H0 of coeﬃcient equality could not be rejected with an
F(20,1805) = 1.15, giving a p-value of 0.289. Therefore we present the results for the
balanced pooled regressions allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients of central in 1992 and 1999.
In the pooled regression debt over-proportionally increases with population size, the
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. More densely populated cities have a compar-
atively lower debt level. If population density increases by 1000/square mile, the debt
level will decrease by 0.04 percent. An increase of 1 percentage point of house owner will
decrease the debt level by −0.5 percent. Cities providing health services have higher debt
levels. A city with 1 percentage point additional seniors will have a -1.6 percent lower
level of debt. Cities with higher crimes rates have signiﬁcantly higher debt burdens. This
captures in part the eﬀect of poverty, a variable which we expected to be associated with
higher debt levels. Central cities have a 17 percent higher debt level. The debt levels
increased in time by 27 and 56 percent as indicated by the time dummies. This captures
exactly the change of the price level, which was 26.6 and 54.8 percent in the period 1985-
91 respectively 1985-99. The structural variables in our empirical speciﬁcation explain
roughly 67 percent of the cross sectional variation in debt levels.
5 Fiscal crises: a cluster analysis
Economic and socio-demographic factors explain almost the entire variance of municipal
spending and a large percentage of the variance of debt. In this section we want to identify
cities, which are likely to be in state of distress and those that are not. It is then assessed
whether these cities are in a situation of crises because of the identiﬁed economic, social
and demographic factors, or whether the causes of crises must be sought in non-structural
factors. There is no data set available reporting the occurrence of crises in American cities.
Therefore we must employ indicators of crises. In all reviewed case studies of municipal
ﬁscal crises, a high debt level was mentioned as a symptom of ﬁscal crisis. High debt
implies that the ﬁnancial independence of a city is limited. Resources must be used to pay
the interest. Credit worthiness is reduced. Thus, cities with a high debt burden can only
to a limited extent react to ﬁnancial challenges. Ultimately this ﬁscal distress can lead to
crisis.This Version: January 30, 2004 10
We partition the cities in two clusters, one with high, the other with low debt per
capita level.10 Applying the described method to our data set taking the debt burden as
the relevant variable results in the cluster characterized in Tables 3 to 5. We limit our
analysis to the same set of cities for all three years, for which we were able to run both
regressions in the previous section, in total 592 cities.
The cluster of cities, which are in distress, is characterized by an average debt burden
per capita 10 times higher than in the rest of the cities in the sample, in later years the
ratio is still 4 to 1. 14 cities have a very high debt burden in 1985, in 1991 the cluster
analysis calculates a lower threshold and the distressed cluster has 37 cities. Finally, in
1999 the threshold is even lower and 75 cities are clustered to be high debt cities. Over
the 15 years considered, the average debt level increased with inﬂation. The standard
deviation of debt levels did not change. However, the extremely high debt levels went
down as for example Farmington, NM, reduced its nominal debt level from more than
30,000 US$ to less than 25,000 US$ per capita. Public expenditure per capita is twice as
high at 1100 dollars in 1985, and roughly 50 percent higher in the later years.
Income per capita is almost the same in the two clusters. Income growth in the last
5 years was somewhat lower in 1985 for the ﬁscally distressed cities, but not in 1991.
Population growth in the preceding 5 years was more than 11 percentage points higher in
1985 and 5.7 percentage points higher in 1991 for distressed cities. The ten year population
growth in the two 1999 groups does not diﬀer. Distressed cities also have larger population
in 1991 and 1999, the diﬀerence is however not statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, in
1991 the population size is three times as high and in 1999 almost four times as high.11
Taxes raised by the city government per capita are the same except for 1999, so are
intergovernmental general revenue and federal grant awards and procurement contract
awards.
Although the structural factors seem to be diﬀerent in the crises cluster, the diﬀerences
are statistically not signiﬁcant. Are the extreme debt levels respectively spending decisions
well predicted by the regression model? A closer look at the data shows, that all 14 cities
in 1985 have a positive residual in the spending and in the debt regressions. Their absolute
mean error is 1.4 as compared to the mean absolute error of the remaining cities of 0.59.
The mean error is thus more than twice as high as the average standard deviation of the
error in the sample. If we take as a threshold 2∗Std.Dev. = 2∗0.56 = 1.12 of the absolute
residual error, 10 of the 14 cities in the ”bad” cluster are outliers. This means, that in
70 percent of the cases, the model can not explain the overly high debt burden well. In
10We also performed the clustering with debt as percent of income. The resulting cluster is almost the
same. Another possible way to cluster the cities is to take the debt level per house per median house value.
The higher this ratio, the lower the possibility to raise funds to pay back the debt. Using this variable as
a cluster variable, however, gives very similar results (available from the author).
11Buettner and Wildasin (2003) ﬁnd some evidence for a soft budget constraint for larger cities, which
is in line with our result that cities with higher debt per capita levels are larger. However, this result has
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1991, the threshold is 2 ∗ 0.63 = 1.26 and even with a broader set of cities found to be
in distress, roughly 50 percent are outliers. The mean absolute residual is larger than in
the non-distressed cluster. In 1999, the threshold is 2 ∗ 0.50 = 1.00 and also 50 percent
of the distressed cities are outliers. The mean absolute residual is higher in the distressed
cluster for all years. As concerns spending, the analysis of residuals yields similar results.
The ﬁt in the distressed cluster is much lower than in the non-distressed cluster.
Thus, a majority of cities have high debt levels because of other reasons, while the high
debt burden of only few cities in the ”crisis cluster” can be explained by structural factors
of the regression analysis. Similarly, the regression analysis explains the spending decisions
of the cities in the distressed cluster far worse than the non-distressed cluster. Thus, other
factors must have caused these extreme cities to accumulate large debt and spend more
than non-distressed cities. The common pool model of municipal spending and debt does
not explain extreme ﬁscal outcomes well, even though it explains a large part of the
variation in debt and spending. For these extreme ﬁscal outcomes other factors must have
been in place. Our results are in line with the result of case studies, which emphasize non-
structural factors like negotiation power of public employees/unionization (the case of New
York and also Philadelphia), excessively high social security programs because of political
preferences of the mayor (New York: John Lindsay in the 1960s, for Philadelphia see Inman
(1995)) as determinants of excessive spending, debt and ultimately crisis. Miranda (1994)
stresses the importance of strong party organization (SPO) to impose ﬁscal discipline. If
SPO is missing, ﬁscal crisis will likely arise. Thus, ﬁscal distress and crisis have a large
non-structural element.
6 Conclusion
Why do some US cities experience a ﬁscal crisis and others do not? This paper proposes
an indirect approach of assessing the relevance of economic and socio-demographic (struc-
tural) factors on the one side and non-structural (management and political) factors on
the other hand. Are cities in distress, and therefore likely to experience a crisis, because
of measurable structural factors or because of other factors?
We present a common pool resource framework. In this model, municipal expenditure
can be explained by simple demand factors like income per capita, the population size
and the value of the tax base and in addition by factors measuring the possible degree of
the common pool problem, like employment per capita, poverty, birth rates, percentage
of seniors, hispanics and crime rates. The common pool model further predicts that
debt levels are higher the worse the common pool problem is. We test this model in
a regression analysis explaining municipal expenditure. The model is able to explain
more than 90 percent of the cross city variation in municipal spending. The coeﬃcients
are shown to change little from 1985 to 1991 and 1997. Thus, municipal spending is a
result of measurable structural factors. Similarly, we show that municipal debt levels areThis Version: January 30, 2004 12
determined by the same common pool factors, with a somewhat lower explained variance
of around 67 percent.
Cities in ﬁscal distress are identiﬁed by means of a cluster analysis. The criterion
for distress is high debt levels. It is shown that distressed cities can be characterized by
debt levels 10 times as high as the average debt level. Spending is around twice as high.
However, the socio-demographic and economic factors of distressed cities appear to have
fairly average values. Spending and debt levels of distressed cities can not be well explained
by the common pool model of spending and debt. In the regression analysis the distressed
cities constitute outliers. Thus, the structural, measured factors can only to a limited
degree account for their speciﬁc debt and spending outcomes. We therefore conclude that
distress and ultimately crisis is a result of non-structural factors, socio-demographic and
economic factors can not account for extreme ﬁscal outcomes.
Future research should investigate the interactions between political factors and eco-
nomic factors and their relevance for ﬁscal crisis. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), e.g., study
the eﬀect of mayors appealing on feelings of strong minorities (in their example the Irish)
that an Irish mayor can better represent their interest, with bad consequences for the local
economy. How is ﬁscal outcome aﬀected by these and other political factors? An addi-
tional avenue for future research concerns intergovernmental relations and their eﬀect on
crises. Inman (2001) argues that the American system is rather successful in preventing
cities from receiving bail-outs. The moral hazard issue thus seems to be solved. However,
it remains to be investigated whether intergovernmental transfer rules can be improved in
such a way as to prevent crisis and not to fall in the trap of moral hazard problems. A
further extension of this line of research would look at the eﬀects of an increased number
of local authorities on ﬁscal outcomes. Our ongoing research suggests that consolidation
of schooling and health services in the municipal budget leads to lower spending for other
services. Are crises more likely to occur in smaller public authorities with a limited num-
ber of responsibilities? Or does, on the contrary, consolidation of all local responsibilities
in one authority prevent crises?This Version: January 30, 2004 13
1985 1991 1985 1991 1997 pooled
log(income per capita) 0.92 0.95
0.16 0.14
log(population) 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.06
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
log(median house value) -0.10 -0.16
0.09 0.08
own house 0.00 -0.18 -0.43 -0.43 -0.60 -0.49
0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08
school 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.28
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.07
health 0.44 0.56 0.41 0.56 0.57 0.50
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04
grant per capita 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.07
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
employment per capita 1.08 0.58
0.28 0.38
income growth -0.04 0.14
0.34 0.18
hispanic -0.31 -0.05 -0.78 -0.57 -0.64 -0.63
0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06
seniors 0.84 0.72 1.22 1.17 0.67 0.91
0.34 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.17
birth 11.51 8.42
3.50 3.03
crime 2.16 1.75 2.99 2.05 3.17 2.37
0.66 0.51 0.65 0.54 0.75 0.33
poverty 1.98 1.78
0.45 0.36
central 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
t2*grant per capita -0.01
0.01






constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 606 606 606 606 606 1818
adj. R
2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.9 0.91 0.92
Table 1: Determinants of general municipal expenditure, comparison of the diﬀerent years
for the same set of cities and if possible the same set of regressors. Standard errors are
reported below the coeﬃcient.This Version: January 30, 2004 14
1985 1991 1999 pooled
log(population) 1.06 1.20 1.17 1.15
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03
population growth 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
population density -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
own house -0.90 -0.37 0.04 -0.51
0.41 0.45 0.40 0.23
school -0.12 -0.26 0.05 -0.08
0.27 0.31 0.28 0.15
health 0.34 0.34 0.19 0.34
0.16 0.19 0.20 0.10
grant per capita 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.06
0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
hispanic -0.47 -0.06 -0.20 -0.21
0.37 0.35 0.26 0.18
seniors -1.63 -1.92 -1.84 -1.63
0.93 1.06 1.09 0.56
crime 2.60 3.42 3.38 2.70
1.53 1.42 1.79 0.81
central 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.23









constant yes yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes yes
obs 629 629 629 1887
adj. R
2 0.63 0.615 0.669 0.667
Table 2: Determinants of municipal debt for a constant set of cities. Standard errors are
reported below the coeﬃcient.This Version: January 30, 2004 15
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debt per capita 14 7472.4 6803.1 4090.8 30594.1
mean income 14 10646.4 1638.3 8574.0 14840.0
income growth 14 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 0.09
population growth 14 12.3 11.4 -3.8 30.6
population 14 104940.7 98420.3 39050.0 356840.0
expenditure per capita 14 1117.8 526.1 533.0 2452.0
police exp. per capita 14 83.4 24.2 53.1 143.1
highway exp. per capita 14 17.1 10.3 1.5 38.0
sewerage expenditure per capita 14 110.9 81.1 7.4 275.7
residuals spending 14 0.52 0.35 0.02 1.18
residuals debt 14 1.40 0.77 0.26 2.78
tax per capita 14 225.8 64.6 113.0 330.0
intergov’t grants per capita 14 140.8 92.7 78.2 407.7
non-distressed cities
debt per capita 578 830.9 643.7 10.8 3693.8
mean income 578 11189.4 2755.5 5275.0 33839.0
income growth 578 0.00 0.07 -0.18 0.22
population growth 578 7.7 12.8 -13.2 65.0
population 578 130483.4 380310.6 24180.0 7262750.0
expenditure per capita 578 625.7 339.7 152.0 2835.0
police exp. per capita 578 79.3 32.3 27.7 346.6
highway exp. per capita 578 15.8 11.5 -28.1 64.4
sewerage expenditure per capita 568 78.0 64.0 0.6 664.5
residuals spending 578 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.35
residuals debt 578 0.59 0.55 0.00 3.52
tax per capita 578 270.2 171.0 35.0 1464.0
intergov’t grants per capita 578 173.1 165.8 9.0 1274.2
Table 3: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1985.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debtpc 37 5624.9 3783.2 3369.2 25599.4
debt per capita growth 37 6.4 29.5 -0.3 180.7
mean income 37 14613.4 3919.9 7238.0 24812.0
income growth 37 0.13 0.11 -0.06 0.44
population growth 37 13.6 26.9 -9.1 117.4
population 37 336049.8 1193024.0 31793.0 7311966.0
expenditure per capita 37 1368.1 861.7 599.0 4587.0
police exp. per capita 37 137.1 61.7 53.4 343.7
highway exp. per capita 37 21.9 13.5 0.9 70.3
sewerage expenditure per capita 34 147.2 102.4 11.5 460.2
residuals spending 37 0.35 0.31 0.00 1.38
residuals debt 37 1.30 0.81 0.03 2.89
tax per capita 37 449.4 388.7 107.0 2193.4
intergov’t grants per capita 37 219.0 328.1 36.0 1838.9
interest as percent of expenditure 37 21.5 13.4 2.2 55.6
non-distressed cities
debtpc 555 1038.7 716.4 3.6 3311.9
debt per capita growth 555 1.0 4.4 -1.0 76.7
mean income 555 14407.6 4462.7 6284.0 55463.0
income growth 555 0.13 0.11 -0.16 0.89
population growth 555 8.8 15.8 -18.9 107.8
population 555 122393.6 238713.2 24356.0 3489779.0
expenditure per capita 555 922.8 510.5 220.0 3751.0
police exp. per capita 555 116.8 49.8 31.4 611.6
highway exp. per capita 555 20.2 12.0 -20.7 78.0
sewerage expenditure per capita 536 110.3 76.2 0.3 604.9
residuals spending 555 0.20 0.17 0.00 1.20
residuals debt 555 0.57 0.59 0.00 5.06
tax per capita 555 385.9 244.6 36.8 1908.3
intergov’t grants per capita 555 232.1 264.9 1.5 1770.6
interest as percent of expenditure 555 6.9 6.1 0.0 77.7
Table 4: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1991.This Version: January 30, 2004 16
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
distressed cities
debtpc 75 4482.3 2827.5 2775.7 24682.9
debt per capita growth 75 1.6 4.9 -0.6 40.1
mean income n.a.
income growth n.a.
population growth 75 8.1 12.7 -11.1 55.8
population 75 425934.4 1077344.0 30273.0 8008278.0
expenditure per capita 75 1673.1 956.0 627.0 5612.0
police exp. per capita 75 190.3 97.0 63.7 644.2
highway exp. per capita 75 22.4 16.2 0.9 68.5
sewerage expenditure per capita 75 175.0 101.8 12.1 487.0
residuals spending 75 0.29 0.26 0.00 1.36
residuals debt 75 0.93 0.56 0.00 2.68
tax per capita 75 648.4 407.9 90.8 2418.5
intergov’t grants per capita 75 464.0 543.8 67.6 2283.5
interest as percent of expenditure 75 11.8 8.6 2.0 50.8
non-distressed cities
debtpc 517 1175.6 645.4 2.9 2714.1
debt per capita growth 517 1.4 8.2 -1.0 136.6
mean income n.a.
income growth n.a.
population growth 517 10.0 14.8 -21.4 140.8
population 517 107449.2 119288.9 25514.0 1321045.0
expenditure per capita 517 1091.2 601.9 301.0 4130.0
police exp. per capita 517 147.4 56.9 44.1 571.7
highway exp. per capita 517 22.9 12.8 -49.5 70.7
sewerage expenditure per capita 503 127.1 74.3 0.8 594.2
residuals spending 517 0.19 0.17 0.00 1.04
residuals debt 517 0.48 0.46 0.00 5.58
tax per capita 517 457.8 273.7 53.7 2070.2
intergov’t grants per capita 517 321.8 399.8 9.5 2929.0
interest as percent of expenditure 516 5.2 3.8 0.0 26.0
Table 5: Summary statistics of cities in the crises and the non-crises cluster in 1999.This Version: January 30, 2004 17
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